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And the Saints Go Marching Out - Rule 1100:
Pennsylvania's Implementation of the Right to a
Speedy Trial
Jacqueline Mikula Verney*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure' im-
* J.D., Duquesne University (1976). Assistant District Attorney, Allegheny County, Penn-
sylvania, 1976-1978; presently, General Assistant Counsel to the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission.
1. PA. R. CaM. P. 1100, Prompt Trial provides:
(a)(1) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant
after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later than two hundred
seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
(2) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant
after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date on which complaint is filed.
(b) For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the
trial judge calls the case to trial.
(c) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trigl, the
attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending the time
for commencement of trial. A copy of such application shall be served upon the defen-
dant through his attorney, if any, and the defendant shall also have the right to be
heard thereon. Such application shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced
within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth. Any order
granting such application shall specify the date or period within which trial shall be
commenced.
(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded
therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney;
(2) any continuance in excess of 30 days granted at the request of the defen-
dant or his attorney, provided that only the period beyond the 30th day shall
be so excluded.
(e)(1) When a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has been perfected,
the new trial shall commence within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the date
of the order granting a new trial.
(2) When an appellate court has granted a new trial, or has affirmed an order of a
trial court granting a new trial, the new trial shall commence within one hundred and
twenty (120) days after the appellate court remands the record to the trial court. The
date of remand shall be the date as it appears in the appellate court docket.
(f) At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court for
an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this Rule has been
violated. A copy of such application shall be served upon the attorney for the Common-
wealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon. Any order granting such
application shall dismiss the charges with prejudice and discharge the defendant.
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plements the state constitutional right to a speedy trial2 by requir-
ing the dismissal of charges against a defendant if his trial has not
commenced 180 days after the complaint has been filed. 3 Aside from
some limited statutory exceptions discussed below,4 Rule 1100 sanc-
tions the automatic discharge, without a trial on the merits, of
individuals who otherwise might have been found guilty and sent
to prison.5
Since 1974, its effective date,' Rule 1100, and specifically its per
se approach to speedy trial violations,' has been barraged by criti-
cism, particularly from prosecutors who must succumb to its man-
date. Prior to 1974, the specific nature of the defendant's right to a
speedy trial was determined by a balancing test taking into account
the length and reason for the delay, whether or not the defendant
asserted his right, and the effect of the delay on the defendant's
ability to defend himself. Rule 1100 with its mandatory dismissal
provisions rejects the balancing test and thus makes it less difficult
for the defendant to establish an actionable violation of his right.
This article will cursorily trace the evolution of the right to a
speedy trial, from the Magna Carta to present constitutional protec-
tions, identifying the interests served by the right and examining
the rights that attach upon violation. Following a discussion of the
recent trend among the states to adopt statutes and rules similar to
Pennsylvania's Rule 1100, the article will analyze the operation of
the rule and the body of case law that has developed in interpreting
it.
(g) Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to modify any time limit contained in any
statute of limitations.
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath
a right to . . . have. . . a speedy public trial ....
3. PA. R. CraM. P. 1100(a)(2), 1100(f).
4. PA. R. CrIM. P. 1100(c), 1100(d). See notes 75-88 and accompanying text infra.
5. See Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Rights and Remedies]; Comment, Speedy Trial Guarantees in
Pennsylvania: Impact of Rule 1100, 78 DICK. L. REv. 755, 771 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Impact of Rule 1100].
6. Rule 1100 was adopted June 8, 1973 and pronounced effective as set forth in sections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Rule. Amended and effective December 9, 1974. PA. R. CRuM. P. 1100.
7. PA. R. Cium. P. 1100(f) (failure to bring a defendant to trial within the prescribed 180
days is a per se violation of his right to a speedy trial).
8. For a discussion of how the right to a speedy trial operated in Pennsylvania prior to
Rule 1100, see Impact of Rule 1100, supra note 5, at 760.
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II. HISTORICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Origins
Any discussion of the right to a speedy trial should begin with its
thirteenth century pronouncement in the Magna Carta: "We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right to speedy justice."' But even as early as 1166 in the Assize
of Claredon, evidence of the right can be found. 0 In these early
formulations of the right to a speedy trial, the right was interpreted
as protecting the accused from lengthy pretrial detention. This pro-
tection from lengthy pretrial incarceration surfaced again in the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679," providing for the release on bail of
defendants not indicted at the term following incarceration.' 2 The
idea of a right to a speedy trial crossed the Atlantic with the Ameri-
can colonists, and became part of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 3 Today, the right is protected not only
by the Federal Constitution but by the law of each of the fifty states
as well."
B. Constitutional Development
The Supreme Court has decided comparatively few cases dealing
with the constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial. 5 Coin-
9. Magna Carta, c. 29 (1215). For historical background of the right to a speedy trial, see
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 & nn. 8-21 (1967).
10. In the Assize of Claredon it was stated:
And when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has been arrested through
the aforesaid oath, if the justices are not about to come speedily enough into the
country where they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word to the nearest justice
by some well-informed person that they have arrested such men, and the justices shall
send back word to the sheriffs informing them where they desire the men to be brought
before them; and let the sheriffs bring them before the justices.
2 ENGUSH HISToicAL Documamrrs 408 (1953).
11. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 11 c. 2. See also Rights and Remedies, supra note
5; Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Ohio Follows the Trend, 43 U. CiN. L. Rav. 610, 611
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Follows the Trend].
12. This is the so-called two-term rule. See Rights and Remedies, supra note 5, at 532
n.45.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " For implementation of the Federal
Constitutional right to speedy trial, see Fm. R. Cram. P. 48.
14. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
15. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905) (right to a speedy trial not violated by continu-
ance of New York indictments for removal to stand trial in the District of Columbia); Pollard
1977-78
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mentators are uncertain whether the lack of early case law resulted
from the Court's refusal to hear speedy trial cases or defendants'
failure to assert the right. Nevertheless, a substantial body of law
exploring the various concerns embodied in the right has appeared
in a series of recent cases.
For example, in 1966 in United States v. Ewell,"5 appellees
claimed their right to a speedy trial was infringed when nineteen
months elapsed between dismissal of their first indictments and the
handing down of their second indictments. In holding that no viola-
tion of the right to a speedy trial had occurred, the Supreme Court
announced the interests protected by the sixth amendment. The
Court understood the guarantee was intended: 1) to protect against
undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, 2) to minimize the
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and 3) to
limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an
accused to defend himself. 7
In 1967, the Court elaborated upon the sixth amendment analysis
in Klopfer v. North Carolina. 18 Klopfer, a university professor, was
charged with criminal trespass, and after mistrial had been de-
clared, his case was continued to the following court term.. There-
v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957) (although sentence was not imposed for two years, it
did not amount to a violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial since the delay was not
purposeful or oppressive); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (19-month delay
between original arrests and hearing on indictments did not violate speedy trial provision of
the Constitution); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial held to be a fundamental right and made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (a defendant incarcerated in a
jurisdiction outside of the one where a prior charge was pending must also be afforded a
speedy trial); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (a defendant is not voluntarily outside of
the jurisdiction when imprisoned on an offense committed subsequent to the pending charge;
his right to a speedy trial must still be afforded him); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307
(1971) (although the crimes were committed three years before the indictments were brought,
the Court held the sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial is applicable only after a
person has been accused of a crime, i.e., after arrest or filing of a complaint); Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Court established four factor balancing test for determining violations
of the right to a speedy trial); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
(imprisoned state defendant may resort to federal habeas corpus upon exhaustion of state
remedies in order to compel the state to try him or release him); Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 434 (1973) (when the right to a speedy trial has been infringed, the only possible
remedy is dismissal of the charges); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (defendant need
not prove prejudice to his defense; he may be exposed to prejudice when other interests are
invaded provided the other Barker balancing factors are in defendant's favor).
16. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
17. See id. at 120.
18. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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after, a nolle proseque with leave to reinstate charges at a future
date was entered by the district prosecutor. Under the procedure,
the indictment was not discharged, and the statute of limitations
for the crime was tolled, permitting an indefinite delay between the
date of the indictment and trial. The Court invalidated the North
Carolina nolle proseque procedure, stating that reserving for the
prosecution the right to reinstate the criminal charges violated a
defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Klopfer is an important sixth amendment decision. The Court
recognized that all three interests enumerated in Ewell need not be
infringed before the protection of the right will attach. Since Klopfer
had not been in jail pending trial, the first interest - the right to
be free from lengthy pretrial incarceration - had not been in-
fringed. The Court, nevertheless, believed that the mere pendency
of an indictment subjected the defendant to public scorn, deprived
him of employment, and curtailed his freedom of speech and asso-
ciation."1 The Klopfer Court thusrelied primarily on enchroachment
of the second interest, minimization of concern and anxiety accom-
panying public accusation, to invalidate the North Carolina proce-
dure. The effect of the decision was to force the prosecution to drop
the charges or proceed to trial without delay. Furthermore, the
Court announced that the right to a speedy trial was one of the
fundamental and basic rights preserved by the Constitution.3 By
incorporating the right to a speedy trial into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the Court imposed federal speedy
trial standards on the states. Thereafter, all speedy trial claims were
to be measured by federal standards, unless state law offered greater
protection.2'
Evolution of the right to a speedy trial continued in Smith v.
Hooey.22 In 1960, while imprisoned in the federal penitentiary in
Leavenworth, Kansas, petitioner Smith was indicted in Texas for
theft. After filing numerous "motions" to commence trial, Smith
brought a mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court ask-
ing for a rule to show cause why the pending charge should not be
dismissed. When mandamus was refused, Smith petitioned the
19. Id. at 222.
20. Id. at 223.
21. See Note, Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STA. L. Rzv. 476, 477 n.6 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Speedy Trial].
22. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
1977-78
Duquesne Law Review
United States Supreme Court. The Court, referring to the three
interests enunciated in Ewell as "constitutional demands," held
that the delay in bringing a defendant to trial on a charge pending
in one jurisdiction while the defendant was incarcerated in another
state for a separate offense infringed upon the defendant's constitu-
tional guarantee to a speedy trial.2
The Court evaluated the effects of the Texas indictment on the
defendant and found the charge prejudiced all three interests pro-
tected by the right to a speedy trial. The Court dispelled the for-
merly accepted view that a defendant's interest against undue and
oppressive incarceration, the first interest protected by the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial, could not be infringed when the
defendant was already in prison. Even though the defendant was
already incarcerated on a separate charge, denial of a speedy trial
violated his interest in freedom from oppressive incarceration. Since
trial would not occur until the defendant's prison term had run, a
consecutive sentence would be inevitable and he was thereby denied
the possibility of receiving at least a partially concurrent sentence.
Furthermore, the defendant might be denied parole or his prison
conditions might worsen because of the pending charge. 4
The Court next indicated that the defendant's interest against
prolonged public accusation with its accompanying anxiety was also
affected despite the accused's presence in prison on another charge.
This interest, as developed in the Klopfer opinion, focuses on the
deterioration of the accused's relationship with society. Arguably,
once the accused was in prison, his societal relationship could not
deteriorate further. In Hooey, however, the Court concentrated on
the accused's personal anxiety, the resultant depression, the lower-
ing of his morale, and the ultimate corrosive effects on a prisoner's
rehabilitation. The Court found that the defendant's right to a
speedy trial was violated because the pending charge caused such
anxiety.2
Finally, the Court noted that impairment of defendant's ability
to defend himself, the third interest served by the right to speedy
23. The Supreme Court of Texas had conceded in its opinion that if the defendant had
been incarcerated in Texas, he would have been given a trial upon request. The Texas court,
however, refused to infringe upon the authority of another state by ordering a defendant's
appearance in a Texas court. Id. at 380.
24. Id. at 378 & n.8.
25. Id. at 378-79.
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trial, was markedly increased when the defendant was in prison."
Incarcerated far from the location of the pending charge, the ac-
cused was unable to confer with witnesses, or even keep track of
them. Furthermore, the passage of time might erode any investiga-
tion the defendant had conducted. Thus, the Court concluded in
Hooey that all three interests protected by the right to a speedy trial
were violated when an out-of-state prisoner was not tried within a
reasonable time after his request for trial.
In 1971, the Court limited the scope of the sixth amendment
when, in United States v. Marion,2 it declared that the right to a
speedy trial attached only after chargesn were brought. In 1970, the
defendant, Marion, was indicted for fraudulent business practices
which allegedly occurred between 1965 and 1966. The Federal Trade
Commission learned of defendant's scheme involving misrepresen-
tation, alteration of documents, and nonperformance of contracts in
1967. and issued a cease and desist order. When the criminal indict-
ments did not follow until 1970, Marion argued that the three year
delay from the time the government learned of the offense and the
date of the indictment violated his right to a speedy trial under the
sixth amendment. The Court conceded that the ability of the ac-
cused to defend was prejudiced by the delay, but nevertheless de-
nied Marion's constitutional claim by finding this possible interfer-
ence with the ability to defend to be insufficient reason to wrench
the sixth amendment from its proper context.2 Thus the Court
refused to extend the right to a speedy trial to pre-accusation delays
reasoning that the statute of limitations provided a sufficient safe-
guard against unreasonably lengthy delays between the time when
the alleged offense occurred and the indictment °
The Court's decision illustrated the relative importance of and
the time factors inherent in the three protected interests. In Klopfer,
the Court found a denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial solely
on a showing that his interest in minimizing public accusation was
prejudiced. In Marion, the defendant's ability to present his defense
26. Id. at 379.
27. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
28. While making it clear that the right was not necessarily dependent upon formal
charges, the Court did not pinpoint the exact time the right would attach. The reach of the
sixth amendment did not, however, extend to pre-arrest. Id. at 321.
29. Id. at 321-22.
30. In the instant case, the statute of limitations, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970),
was fiv;e years. Id. at 324 n.15.
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was impaired, but the sixth amendment protection was not opera-
tive. The inconsistency, however, is only superficial. The interest in
being free from pretrial incarceration and the anxiety accompanying
public accusation is not necessarily violated until an offense has
been charged. In contrast, while pre-accusation delay may injure a
defendant's defense, sufficient safeguards are provided by the stat-
ute of limitations. It appears, therefore, that the speedy trial protec-
tions will not be implemented when the only interest prejudiced is
afforded protection by another guarantee. Furthermore, the Court
may have given the third interest, defense preparation, an apparent
subordinate role in Marion, not only because of the alternate safe-
guard, but also because of the dual effect delay has on defendant's
defense - the delay may in fact benefit the accused.3
Probably the most important decision on the speedy trial guaran-
tee was made in Barker v. Wingo." Barker had been charged with
the 1958 deaths of an elderly couple. More than five years later, after
Barker's accomplice was finally convicted," Barker went to trial on
the murder charges. Although the Court affirmed Barker's convic-
tion,3" it established a balancing test to determine whether a defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial has been violated.
The Court identified four factors to be considered in determining
a sixth amendment speedy trial violation: 1) length of delay, 2) the
reason for delay, 3) the defendant's assertion of his right, 3 and 4)
31. The suggestion that delay may benefit the defense was recognized in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), where the Court stated:
A second difference between the right to a speedy trial and the accused's other
constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advan-
tage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission
of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories
may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, some-
times seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus,
unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability
to defend himself.
Id. at 521.
32. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
33. It took six trials to convict Barker's accomplice, Silas Manning, of both murders. Id.
at 516-17.
34. The Court felt Barker was satisfied with trial delay, that he was gambling on Manning
not being convicted, making his chances of acquittal better. Only when Manning was con-
victed in early 1963 did delay begin to prejudice Barker. Id. at 536.
35. This is the so-called demand rule. See generally Godbold, Speedy Trial - Major
Surgery for a National 11, 24 ALA. L. Rzv. 265, 277-80 (1972) [hereinafter cited as National
Ill]; Rights and Remedies, supra note 5, at 539-41; Speedy Trial, supra note 21, at 482-85;
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prejudice to the defendant." Recognizing that a balancing test re-
quired ad hoc application, the Court did give some guidelines by
stating that when delay occurred between arrest and trial, rather
than between knowledge of the crime and the indictment as in
Marion, the most serious deprivation of the right to a speedy trial
was the prejudice to defendant's interest in preparing his defense.
Soon after Barker, the Court considered what relief should be
afforded a defendant when his right to a speedy trial is infringed
upon. In Strunk v. United States,3 the defendant had been con-
victed of interstate transportation of a stolen automobile. Strunk
claimed a ten month delay between the indictment and his trial
violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals found
Strunk's right to a speedy trial had been violated, but instead of
dismissing the charges, it ordered the lower court to credit the delay
between the indictment and arraignment, 259 days, to the defen-
dant's sentence .3 On petition, the Supreme Court held that once a
denial of the right to speedy trial is found, the only possible remedy
is dismissal of the charges."
At least one commentator has expressed abhorrence of the remedy
announced in Strunk." To ameliorate its effect, Professor Amster-
dam suggests a limited reading of the case: dismissal of the charges
is appropriate only as a posttrial remedy. Appropriate preconviction
remedies, corresponding to the interest prejudiced, include release
from jail when lengthy pretrial incarceration occurs and dismissal
of the charge without prejudice when anxiety accompanies pro-
longed public accusation. A violation should warrant dismissal only
when defendant's defense has been prejudiced. 2
Although the discussion thus far has concentrated on the defen-
dant's rights, the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial not only
protects defendants, but protects societal interests as well. 3 Those
Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Tial, 51 VA. L. Rav. 1587, 1594 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Lagging Right].
36. 407 U.S. at 530.
37. Id. at 532.
38. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
39. United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
40. 412 U.S. at 440. But see Rights and Remedies, supra note 5, at 532-39.
41. Rights and Remedies, supra note 5, at 532-39.
42. Id. at 535.
43. In Barker the Court stated:
The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights
enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition to the
1977-78
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interests advanced by a prompt trial include administrative effi-
ciency, cost savings, more effective prosecution, and early rehabili-
tation." Another interest, although not directly protected by the
right to a speedy trial, but nonetheless served by operation of the
sixth amendment, is the societal interest in public justice - the
interest in quickly punishing a criminal for his anti-social acts.,5
HI. RECENT TREND
Undeniably, there has been a recent trend in criminal justice to
quantify the time lapse between arrest and trial, thereby rendering
certain conduct a per se violation of the right to a speedy trial."6 For
example, the Second Circuit announced rules on the subject,'7 and
the American Bar Association covered the topic in its Minimum
Standards of Criminal Justice." All of the statutory and judicial
announcements are similar in that they provide for a specific time
period in which a defendant must be brought to trial." Pennsyl-
vania's Rule 1100 is a good example of this recent trend.
general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair proce-
dures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from,
and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.
407 U.S. at 519.
44. Id. at 519-21. See also Ohio Follows the Trend, supra note 11, at 612.
45. In Ewell, the Court states: "A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a dele-.
terious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect
itself." 383 U.S. at 120.
46. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in every state constitution except those of
New York and Nevada. Both states, however, have statutes protecting the right. See e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970); FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.191; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 102-5 (Smith-
Hurd 1970); IND. R. CiuM. P. 4; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 277, § 72 (West 1968); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-17-1 (1972); NE.. REv. STAT. § 178.495 (1971); N.M. R. Caim. P. 95; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15.10 (1965); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.71-.73 (Page 1974); PA. R. CalM. P. 1100. For a
complete list of the state constitutional provisions, see Comment, The Convicts Right to a
Speedy Trial, 61 J. CmuM. L. 352, 356 & n.54 (1970).
47. These rules were announced at the close of the opinion in the case of United States
ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971). For a discussion of these rules, see
Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding the Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit Rules];
Note, A Look at the New Second Circuit Rates for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases,
56 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1971); Ohio Follows the Trend, supra note 11, at 618-19.
48. ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice - Relating to Speedy Trial
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter referred to as ABA Standards].
49. It should be noted that in Barker, the Court refused to set a specific time period for
the defendant to be brought to trial, believing it not to be constitutionally required, but a
legislative function. The Court, however, recognized the states' right to implement such
requirements. 407 U.S. at 523.
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IV. PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1100
Rule 1100" was formulated to protect the criminal defendant's
right to a speedy trial and to help eliminate the backlog in criminal
cases in Pennsylvania. 1 Simply stated, Rule 1100 provides that
criminal defendants be brought to trial" within 180 days53 from the
date on which the complaint is filed; if they are not, the complaint
against them is discharged with prejudice. 54
Logically, then, judicial analysis in Rule 1100 questions begins
with a calculations of the number of days from the date of the
complaint to the time trial commences. 5 If that figure exceeds the
statutorily imposed limitation of 180 days, a delay exists which may
or may not warrant discharge. The court will.find a violation of Rule
1100 and dismiss the charges when the delay cannot be excluded by
1100(d)(1) or (d)(2) exceptions, or by a timely filed, properly
granted 1100(c) extension by the Commonwealth.57
50. For a discussion of speedy trial guarantees in Pennsylvania prior to Rule 1100, see
Impact of Rule 1100, supra note 5, at 757. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 246 Pa.
Super. Ct. 371, 371 A.2d 885 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488, 368 A.2d 1261
(1977); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 115, 364 A.2d 477 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Watson, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 426, 360 A.2d 710 (1976); Commonwealth v. Wilson,
238 Pa. Super. Ct. 340, 357 A.2d 163 (1976).
51. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972). Rule 1100 was devised
pursuant to the opinion in Hamilton. See PA. R. CraM. P. 1100, Comment.
52. PA. R. CalM. P. 1100(b) and the Comment to the rule explain when the trial actually
commences for purposes of the rule.
53. PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100(a)(2). PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100(a)(1) applies to cases where the
complaint was filed before July 1, 1974 and gives the prosecution 270 days to bring a defen-
dant to trial.
54. PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100(f).
55. PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100, Comment states: "It is intended that the number of days set
forth in paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) be calculated as prescribed by the Act of November 25, 1970,
P.L. 707, No. 290, § 3, 1 P.S. § 1908." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1908 (Purdon 1964) provides
in part:
When any period of time is referred to in any statute, such period in all cases. . shall
be so computed as to exclude the first and include the last day of such period. When-
ever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday and Sunday, or on any day
made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such
day shall be omitted from the computation.
The author notes that § 1908, its specific application going only to statutes, is here applied
to a procedural rule. This obvious conflict is intensified upon examination of the language of
Rule 1100: "Trial . ..shall commence no later than . . . days from the date on which the
complaint is filed. " (Emphasis supplied). It is curious that § 1908 is utilized at all when the
reading of the Rule is clear on its face.
56. See PA. R. CitM. P. 1100(a)(2).
57. Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 350 A.2d 872 (1976). O'Shea arose when the
defendant was awarded a new trial by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following reversal of
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 16: 531
Perhaps the most important decision on Rule 1100 is
Commonwealth v. Shelton,8 wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared that" 'judicial delay' may justify the granting of an
application for an extension when timely filed." 5 It is to be empha-
sized that judicial delay is only applicable to Rule 1100(c) exten-
sions and not appropriate for (d)(1) or (2) exclusions." Two exam-
his murder conviction. 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713 (1974). Under Rule 1100(e), O'Shea was to
be retried within 90 days (now 120). The Commonwealth, petitioning to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, received an 1100(c) extension. Trial was to commence
within 30 days from disposition of the petition to the Supreme Court. When certiorari was
denied, the Commonwealth improperly listed trial seventy (70) days later, forty (40) days
beyond the extension. When the trial court dismissed the indictment, the Commonwealth
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court ruled the discharge of O'Shea
proper, explaining inter alia, that once the extended period expired, the Commonwealth
could not petition for an additional extension under Rule 1100(c). Finding such a maneuver
untimely, the court cited Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 336 A.2d 273 (1975), an early
Rule 1100 case. The court further explained that an extension for the Commonwealth under
1100(c) did not toll the original time period, but created a new limitation within which trial
must commence. Any new extension must be requested within that limitation. But, if trial
is scheduled beyond the set period, the Commonwealth may still present testimony regarding
time excludable due to the defendant.
58. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 195, 361 A.2d 873, aff'd, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976). In Shelton,
a special investigating grand jury returned a presentment against the defendant on December
20, 1973. An indicting grand jury returned a true bill against Shelton on January 3,'1974.
Shelton then obtained a discovery order from the lower court which was found to be in conflict
with a previous impounding order. On July 3, 1974, the impounding order was modified; on
October 9, 1974, a pretrial hearing to dispose of motions was held where Shelton made an
oral motion to dismiss pursuant to 1100(f), which was followed by a written motion on
October 21, 1974. The Commonwealth answered the petition and filed for an 1100(c) exten-
sion on November 14, 1974. The lower court denied Shelton's dismissal motion but certified
the case for immediate appeal. The superior court reversed the lower court and dismissed the
indictment against Shelton. The Commonwealth petitioned for allowance of appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which was granted.
Besides holding judicial delay could be an acceptable exclusion under 1100(c), the court
further explained the operation of Rule 1100. The court observed that 1100(f) triggers the
presentation of circumstances leading to the excludable periods under 1100(d)(1) and (2).
Also, in determining whether an extension has been timely filed by the Commonwealth,
excluded periods under 1100(d) are considered.
Lastly, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of the indictment since the Com-
monwealth failed to file a timely extension.
59. 469 Pa. at 15, 364 A.2d at 698.
60. See also Commonwealth v. Kelly, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 369 A.2d 879 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Kemp, 245 Pa. Super. Ct., 294, 369 A.2d 410 (1976); Commonwealth v. May-
field, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). The question of whether judicial delay should be an
allowable extension has been answered in some jurisdictions with the "ready-rule". See
generally Ohio Follows the Trend, supra note 11, at 629-33. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971) (Second Circuit Rule 4); N.Y. CaM. Paoc.
LAw § 38.30 (McKinney 1972).
The underlying rationale is that the defendant's right to a speedy trial is protected to the
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ples given by the court as possible acceptable judicial delays, al-
though not exclusive, were pending judicial proceedings in the case"
and scheduling congestion.2
Appellate courts in the Commonwealth have extensively explored
the various sections of Rule 1100. One of the intricacies of 1100(a)
was recently decided when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court inter-
preted the meaning of when the complaint is filed. 3 In an arrest by
warrant, the date on which the complaint is filed was found to be
the date when criminal proceedings are initiated. The court further
stated that when there is a warrantless arrest, criminal proceedings
begin with the arrest, but refused to decide in the warrantless arrest
situation, whether the arrest or the presentment of the complaint
would commence the running of the mandatory period.6 ' In an inter-
pretation of what constitutes a complaint under the Juvenile Act"
for purposes of 1100(a), a delinquency petition was found not to be
a complaint." The Superior Court held that criminal proceedings
were initiated for 1100(a) only when the Criminal Division of the
court obtained jurisdiction of the charges from Juvenile Court. 7
Other questions regarding this section arise when the original com-
plaint is dismissed and a second one is brought. When the initial
complaint is properly dismissed and there is no improper prosecu-
torial design to circumvent Rule 1100, then the rule commences to
extent that the prosecution has used due diligence. When the prosecution is not responsible
for delay, that is, delay is predicated by the judiciary, although the defendant's right to a
speedy trial may be infringed, it is not infringed at the hands of the prosecution.
61. See Commonwealth v. Bowers, 250 Pa. Super. Ct. 77, 378 A.2d 461 (1977) (time
consumed by the trial court in determining pretrial motions is not excludable under 1100(d));
Commonwealth v. Millhouse, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 445, 362 A.2d 398 (1976) (Commonwealth
argued that seventy-nine day delay over confusion of a discovery order was excludable under
1100(d), but the court found the delay not excludable under 1100(d), although it might have
qualified for an 1100(c) extension had the Commonwealth filed a timely motion to extend).
62. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Kollock, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 16, 369 A.2d 787 (1977i
(Commonwealth's 1100(c) extension properly granted if timely filed, if the Commonwealth
has exercised due diligence, and trial is scheduled at earliest possible date); Commonwealth
v. Fisher, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 361, 368 A.2d 762 (1976) (where delay is occasioned by court
congestion, trial court may properly grant the Commonwealth's 1100(c) petition for exten-
sion).
63. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977).
64. Id. at 558 n.2, 372 A.2d at 829 n.2.
65. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, No. 333, 1972 Pa. Laws 1146, § 11, il PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 50-
101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
66. Commonwealth v. Bell, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 164, 369 A.2d 345 (1977).
67. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has granted petition for allowance of appeal in
the case.
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run with the filing of the subsequent complaint. 8 However, where
a portion of the charges arising out of a criminal transaction are still
pending, the 180-day rule for a subsequent complaint on a related
offense will run from the date of the original complaint."
Rule 1100(b) defines "commencement of trial" as the date when
the judge calls the case to court; some first step in the commence-
ment must be shown,70 that is, a substantial commitment of the
court's time, leading to a determination of guilt or innocence.71 Re-
cent decisions have determined that trial does not necessarily
commence with the hearing on a suppression motion unless the
hearing has been reserved to be heard at trial.72 If the defense fails
to apply for dismissal of the charges under 1100(f) prior to com-
mencement of trial, the issue is waived. 3
Rule 1100(c) permits the Commonwealth to petition the court for
an order extending the 180 day period. The Commonwealth's peti-
tion must be timely submitted" and will be granted only if trial
cannot commence "despite due diligence by the Commonwealth. 75
The extension does not toll the original period but creates a new
limitation within which trial must commence.76 As discussed earlier,
judicial delay may be grounds for an extension7 7 under 1100(c), but
what constitutes "due diligence" 8 has been somewhat more elusive.
68. Commonwealth v. Mumich, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 209, 361 A.2d 359 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Braithwaite, 385 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
69. Commonwealth v. Earp, 476 Pa. 369, 382 A.2d 1215 (1978).
70. Commonwealth v. Evans, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 142, 375 A.2d 799 (1977).
71. See PA. R. CraM. P. 1100, Comment. See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 245 Pa.
Super. Ct. 146, 378 A.2d 906 (1976).
72. Commonwealth v. Lane, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 146, 369 A.2d 335 (1976).
73. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa. Super. Ct. 250, 378 A.2d 921 (1977).
74. Commonwealth v. Harris, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 503, 366 A.2d 267 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Walk, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 437, 362 A.2d 378 (1976); Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255,
336 A.2d 273 (1975).
In determining whether an extension is timely filed, a court will consider properly excluded
delays pursuant to 1100(d). Commonwealth v. Kidd, 251 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 380 A.2d 416
(1977).
75. See PA. R. CanM. P. 1100(c).
76. See Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 350 A.2d 872 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Adams, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 352 A.2d 97 (1975). The courts have explicitly condemned
the practice of lower courts holding the extension hearing beyond the period. Commonwealth
v. Mancuso, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 372 A.2d 444 (1977).
77. See text accompaning notes 57-61 supra. See also Commonwealth v. Kollock, 246 Pa.
Super. Ct. 16, 369 A.2d 787 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rambo, 250 Pa. Super. Ct. 314, 378 A.2d 953 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Mancuso, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 372 A.2d 444 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Martin, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 407, 371 A.2d 903 (1977); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 247 Pa. Super.
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Rule 1100 provides certain exceptions in calculating the pre-
scribed 180 days.7 Section (d)(1) excludes from the 180-day period
the time in which the defendant or his attorney are unavailable.5 0
A requirement of due diligence has, however, been read into the
language of 1100(d)(1), 1 and consequently, for a delay to be ex-
cluded pursuant to 1100(d)(1), the Commonwealth must demon-
strate, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's
whereabouts were unknown and that the police exercised due dili-
gence in attempting to locate him,"2 even if he is incarcerated else-
where. 83 The courts have also determined that a delay caused by a
co-defendant, but not agreed to by the defendant, is not excludable
pursuant to 1100(d)(1).8
Another exception to the 180-day calculation is found in Section
1100(d)(2). It provides that for any continuance of greater than 30
days requested by the defendant, each day over 30 will be excluded
from the calculation of the mandatory period. In Commonwealth v.
Shields, 5 the superior court held that nothing in the rule or else-
where limited the defendant to only one 30-day continuance during
the mandatory period." In a 4-3 decision,87 the majority justified its
literal reading of the rule by noting that a continuance is within the
discretion of the trial judge and if a defendant requests a continu-
ance near the end of the period, the court could condition the con-
Ct. 46, 371 A.2d 1318 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 364 A.2d 330
(1976); Commonwealth v. Hagans, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 393, 364 A.2d 328 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Mayfield, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 362 A.2d 994, rev'd, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345
(1976); Commonwealth v. Shelton, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 195, 361 A.2d 873, affl'd, 469 Pa. 8, 364
A.2d 694 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975).
79. The actual calculation of the 180 days is provided by statute. See note 56 supra.
80. See PA. R. CriM. P. 1100(d)(1). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 247 Pa. Super.
Ct. 132, 371 A.2d 1362 (1977); Commonwealth v. Haynes, 245"Pa. Super. Ct. 17, 369 A.2d
271 (1976).
81. See PA. R. CiuM. P. 1100, Comment.
82. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Martofel, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 206, 375 A.2d 60 (1977); Commonwealth v. McCafferty, 242 Pa.
Super. Ct. 218, 363 A.2d 1239 (1976).
83. Commonwealth v. Flores, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 140, 371 A.2d 1366 (1977).
84. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 246 Pa. 196, 369 A.2d 879 (1976). But see Common-
wealth v. Devoy, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 353, 375 A.2d 134 (1977) (Commonwealth's witness'
unavailability does not render defendant unavailable under 1100(d)(1)); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 364 A.2d 330 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hagans, 242 Pa. Super.
Ct. 393, 364 A.2d 328 (1976).
85. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 371 A.2d 1333 (1977).
86. Id. at 77, 371 A.2d at 1334.
87. Writing the dissenting opinion was Judge Van de Voort, joined by President Judge
Watkins and Judge Jacobs.
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tinuance on the defendant's waiver of the rule. If necessary, for
example, where the continuance would extend beyond the manda-
tory period, the Commonwealth could obtain an 1100(c) extension.88
The most important section of Rule 1100 in terms of effect is
1100(f). Section (f) allows for the dismissal of the charges with prej-
udice when the mandatory time limitation has been violated,8 and
the defendant files a timely motion. In the context of section (f),
timely has a dual meaning: the petition must be filed prior to trial,
and, more importantly, the petition to dismiss must be made after
the mandatory period has expired. 0
V. CONCLUSION
The flexibility that the United States Supreme Court found es-
sential in establishing its balancing test in Barker to resolve speedy
trial claims is lost in Rule 1100. Admittedly, the rule advances two
important interests: the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial and reduction of the backlog of criminal cases, the latter identi-
fied as a crucial concern of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Hamilton."' Does advancement of these interests,
however, justify release of potentially guilty defendants?
The constitutional protection is difficult to quarrel with; the de-
fendant has a right to a speedy trial and a rule establishing a per se
violation certainly enforces the right by eliminating any required
showing of prejudice. Undoubtedly, more defendants are discharged
under a per se rule and thus, Rule 1100 effectively insures protection
of both the state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.
88. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 78, 371 A.2d at 1335.
89. An 1100(f) dismissal is a final order from which the Commonwealth may appeal.
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 251 Pa. Super. Ct. 162, 380 A.2d 428 (1977).
90. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 362 A.2d 1005 (1976) (where
defense filed an 1100(f) motion to dismiss two days prior to the final trial date and asked that
all proceedings be stayed pending the petition, the court affirmed the denial of the dismissal
petition, finding the petition was untimely). See also Commonwealth v. Richbourgh, 246 Pa.
Super. Ct. 300, 304 n.8, 369 A.2d 1331, 1334 n.8 (1977). ("The validity of a defendant's
petition to dismiss the charges against him pursuant to Section (f) of Rule 1100 depends upon
a showing that the prescribed period was violated at the time of the filing of the petition to
dismiss.").
91. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972). See also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 236 Pa. Super.
Ct. 509, 516, 345 A.2d 754, 757 (1975) ("The purpose of the speedy trial rule [Rule 1100] is
to make sure that defendants receive trials as quickly as possible both for their own satisfac-
tion and in order to preserve the evidence so as to minimize prejudice at trial.").
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But as the United States Supreme Court made clear, the defen-
dant's constitutional right is adequately protected by a balancing
test. The question remaining, therefore, is whether the interest in
reducing the criminal case backlog outweighs the societal interest
in convicting individuals who have committed crimes.

